The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IX, Issue 9 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2004-06-12
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume IX, Issue
9
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/12039
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 9, Number 9 (June 12, 2004) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch and Military 
Reform 
By Susan Cavan 
 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Prosperity replaces legitimacy 
A lot of things have changed in four years. When Vladimir Putin gave his speech 
after his first presidential inauguration in May 2000, it was clear, even in his brief 
remarks, that the legitimacy of his succession weighed heavily: " For the first time 
in the history of our state, supreme power is delivered in the most democratic 
way, according to the people’s will. Legally and peacefully. Change of authority is 
always an examination for the constitutional order. (…) We passed this 
examination with dignity. (1) 
 
In stark contrast to 2000’s bluster, this year’s state of the nation offered a sharp 
rebuke for those who would question the legitimacy of this president or Russia’s 
democracy. "The strengthening of our statehood is sometimes deliberately 
interpreted as authoritarianism. (…) Fidelity to democratic values is dictated by 
the will of our people and by the strategic interests of the Russian Federation 
itself." (2) 
 
Indeed Putin spent far more time addressing state priorities such as housing 
reform, education, health care and the tax system than justifying his right to rule. 
Russian democracy "validated" by elections has produced its President — no 
need to cite the sage advice of the once-beloved (although granted, long ago) 
Yel’tsin to signify the passing of the torch — Putin instead looks forward, stresses 
the freely-chosen actions of the Russian people, and sets a series of goals for his 
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government to attain. His own responsibility (aside from oversight of government 
personnel) he equates with the nation’s aim: "[T]he creation of a free society of 
free people in Russia is our most important task, as well as the most complex 
one." (3) 
 
Perhaps there is a certain Dostoyevskian prejudice at work, but the image of a 
broad but very, very shallow pool springs to mind. 
 
Putin was however, finally able to leave issues of bureaucratic reform out of his 
remarks for the first time in months. Whether the intense jockeying for position 
between Prime Minister Fradkov and Staff Director Kozak has abated or simply 
settled into a new pattern of tit-for-tat behaviors, the issue has fallen off the 
president’s radar screen. (See below for more on Government Reform issues.) 
The apparat reforms, while still adapting to immovable Kremlin forces, are falling 
into a familiar routine as well. (Although the State Council, as the new forum for 
announcing policy initiatives, is also venturing into policy formulation and 
structural reform — a sure sign that some elements of the reforms are not taking 
root.) Putin thus devoted two-thirds of his address to economic goals, the 
success or failure of which will lie at the feet of the government. Above all, the 
call to double the GDP resounded once again from the president’s rostrum. While 
choosing a purely economic, hence governmental, issue as his signature aim for 
the year is a clever play, Putin is running the risk of personal association through 
endless repetition. 
 
Putin did manage to hit a few intriguing notes during his address to the nation. 
For those watching the storm clouds rumbling from the General Staff to the 
Defense Ministry, Putin’s pointed comment on the need "to ensure civilian 
oversight of the effectiveness of the reforms underway in the army," (4) bodes ill 
for General Kvashnin (bearing in mind that retired General Ivanov was appointed 
as a "civilian" Defense Minister). (See Military Reform below.) 
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Will Fradkov hold off Kozak? 
The past few weeks have seen the public revelation of an obvious conundrum: Is 
Kozak, as (lead) author of the administrative reforms of the government and 
Kremlin, and Director of the Government Staff, in fact running the Government or 
is the Prime Minister actually responsible for the workings of his Council of 
Ministers? Recent stories suggested that Fradkov had some form of final 
approval over Kozak’s reforms. (5) 
 
The recent "government secrecy" controversy however, had Fradkov diving for 
cover. An early report of the new government classification rules claimed, "The 
Fradkov government" would forbid the dissemination of "information about the 
issues being considered by the government." (6) (A level of secrecy unmatched 
since the days of Primakov’s leadership.) By the next day, news accounts (no 
doubt with the help of the Prime Minister’s press assistant), identified the 
unpopular new secrecy regulations as having been "drafted by Cabinet Chief-of-
Staff Dmitri Kozak." (7) 
 
Whether or not by design, Putin has managed to prevent, at least for the time 
being, the creation of an alternative power base at the Government's White 
House by pitting the Prime Minister against the reform-magician; Kozak is as 
effectively neutralized as Fradkov. That leaves only one clear possible successor 
at this early stage…. 
 
MILITARY REFORM 
Can Kvashnin be toppled? 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov seems to be on a mission — in fact, he may 
have been on this mission for a very long time, but it now seems ready to 
produce the desired results. Chief of the General Staff, Anatoli Kvashnin, finally 
appears vulnerable enough to move against — and Ivanov is poised for the take 
down. 
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While turf wars between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are by no 
means new, there is plenty of evidence that Kvashnin’s ouster has been on 
Ivanov’s wish list for quite some time. Recent developments suggest a rapid time 
frame for the move. 
 
In April for example, Kvashnin attempted to remove a CIS rival, General Vladimir 
Yakovlev, Chief of Staff of the CIS HQ for Military Cooperation. Ivanov proposed 
the extension of Yakovlev’s term. (8) Yakovlev and Ivanov won the day. 
Interestingly, Kvashnin’s distrust of Yakovlev stems from another DefMin-
GenShtab battle, when Sergeyev held Ivanov’s job and Yakovlev sided with him 
and the Defense Ministry against Kvashnin. (9) The speculation over Yakovlev's 
suitability as a replacement for Kvashnin only fuels the General's ire. 
 
In May, the Duma took up consideration of amendments to the Law on Defense 
aimed at curtailing the authority of the General Staff. (10) The proposed changes 
include the removal of the formulation of proposals for the Military Doctrine from 
General Staff purview, as well as an end to its coordinating role in regard to the 
Armed Forces and among the security agencies. (11) 
 
A counterattack, of sorts, was launched in Novaya gazeta by Pavel Felgenhauer, 
who cautioned the President that he is being misinformed as to the status of 
weapons systems, a situation that has led to the President’s utterance of 
dangerously mistaken claims. "Being from state security, the supreme 
commander-in-chief does not understand that he is framed once again…" (12) 
Felgenhauer also makes a strong case that the corruption and theft bloating the 
defense budget may be the result of Defense Ministry, and specifically the arms 
export industry (that Ivanov controls), waste, mismanagement and fraud. 
Felgenhauer even cites an Auditing Commission report on the gross misuse of 
funds at the Defense Ministry, and highlights the abuses of exports and 
procurements. Is it enough to save Kvashnin and the General Staff from 
"Ivanovshchina"? Time will tell, but the omens are not auspicious. 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) RIA Oreander, 10 May 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(2) RTR Russia TV, 0800 GMT, 26 May 04; BBC Monitoring via Johnson’s 
Russia List (JRL), #8225, 27 May 04. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "PM approves composition of administrative reforms," ITAR-TASS, 24 May 04 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) Vedomosti, 26 May 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(7) Gazeta, 27 May 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(8) Russkii Kurier, 16 Apr 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Nezavisimaya Voennoe Obozrenie, 18 May 04; WPS Defense and Security 
via ISI Emerging Markets database. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Novaya gazeta, No. 38, 31 May-2 Jun 04; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Trepashkin sentenced 
In mid-January, the trial of two men accused of complicity in the 1999 Moscow 
apartment bombings concluded with their convictions. (1) The trial, and events 
surrounding it, were not uncontroversial. On 22 October, Mikhail Trepashkin, a 
lawyer representing one of the victim’s family, was arrested during an apparently 
routine traffic stop. Several days later, while still in custody, his case was passed 
to the FSB. After a search of his apartment, FSB officials announced that 
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classified documents had been discovered and that Trepashkin was to face the 
charge of divulging state secrets. Trepashkin, a former FSB officer himself, 
claimed he had evidence implicating the FSB in the apartment bombings, which 
would be brought to light at the trial. It seems clear that he was arrested in order 
to prevent his evidence against the FSB from reaching the public eye. (2) Since 
his arrest in October, Trepashkin has been held at the FSB’s notorious 
Matrosskaya Tishina Prison (the same location at which Yukos boss Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky has been detained), while he was awaiting trial. 
 
In the last ten days, it has emerged that Trepashkin’s trial in fact began just 
weeks after his arrest, and that it was a closed-door affair, conducted by the 
Moscow Military District Court. It seems that even Trepashkin’s wife did not know 
the trial had started. In February, she lodged a personal appeal to British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair via the British Embassy in Moscow, requesting political 
asylum for Trepashkin in the United Kingdom. No reply was received from British 
diplomats. (3) 
 
Three charges were leveled at Trepashkin. First, he was accused of possession 
of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition. Second, he was charged with 
possessing secret documents dating from his time as an FSB officer. Third, he 
was accused of divulging state secrets. (4) 
 
The second and third charges deserve attention because the details reveal how 
thin the evidence against Trepashkin really is. The charge concerning the 
documents found in Trepashkin’s apartment seems to have been based entirely 
on hearsay. According to the St. Petersburg Times, the allegation was based on 
a "report from a former FSB agent that Trepashkin showed him classified 
documents kept from his time in the service." (5) The indictment relating to 
divulgence was even thinner. Trepahskin’s lawyer, Valeri Glushenkov, stated that 
the accusation related to an event in October 2002 in which Trepashkin passed 
information to another former FSB officer, Viktor Shebalin: 
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"Trepashkin received reports that a certain Abdul appeared in Moscow at that 
time. He was an influential field commander. Mikhail [Trepashkin] understood 
that he intended to do something awful in Moscow. He printed information about 
the field commander and passed it over to Shelabin, who continued cooperation 
with the FSB." (6) This evidence, Glushenkov added, could have been used by 
the FSB to prevent the Moscow theater siege that was to occur later that month. 
(7) Glushenkov was speaking a day after the conclusion of Trepashkin’s trial. His 
client was found guilty of all charges, and sentenced by Judge Sergei Sedov to 
serve four years in a "remote settlement." Trepashkin in other words, is not to 
serve a ‘prison’ term, but is to be ‘internally exiled’. (8) Glushenkov, Trepashkin’s 
plans to appeal the verdict to the Supreme Court’s military tribunal. (9) 
 
Minutes before the judge passed sentence, a small group of reporters was 
allowed to enter the courtroom. From the defendant’s cage, Trepashkin was 
permitted to speak with them briefly. He claimed that the case was politically 
motivated, and did not "stand up to criticism from a legal point of view." (10) 
Trepashkin added that the trial was "linked" to his work for the Terror 1999 
Commission, and that without his involvement in those investigations, there 
would have been no trial. (11) 
 
It is evident that Trepashkin's trial was held in secret and behind closed doors so 
that the public would have no chance of hearing Trepashkin’s evidence 
implicating the FSB in the 1999 apartment bombings. Moreover, according to 
Alexander Podrabinek, editor of Prima News Human Rights Service, the verdict 
is designed as a warning to others not to question official responses to the 
Commission’s findings. (12) Podrabinek added that in his view, this verdict, while 
a setback, did not provide the FSB a guarantee that "we will never find out what 
actually happened." (13) 
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Podrabinek's optimism, such as it is, may well be misplaced. Aleksandr 
Litvinenko’s book FSB Blows Up Russia, while it may be convincing, is tainted 
due to the author’s association with Boris Berezovsky. Mikhail Trepashkin will 
soon be languishing in internal exile. To believe that the FSB or President Putin 
will ever allow an independent investigation into the 1999 bombings is at best 
naïve, and at worst a serious underestimation of the pervasive nature and power 
of the security services throughout Russian society, be it in the judicial, political 
or civil spheres. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX Number 01, 23 Jan 04. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ekho Moskvy Radio, 26 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(4) WPS Defense and Security, 24 May 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(5) The St. Petersburg Times, 21 May 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(6) WPS Defense and Security, 24 May 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Info Prod-Strategic Business Information, 24 May 04 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(10) The St. Petersburg Times, 21 May 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
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Who will manage Russia’s CIS relations? 
Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear in his 26 May State-of-the-Nation 
speech that Moscow’s relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) continue to play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy. Speaking 
before both houses of parliament, Putin stated: "Work to intensify integration in 
the sphere of the Commonwealth of Independent States remains our priority…." 
(1) 
 
Recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, in discussing upcoming 
reforms to his ministry’s staffing, indicated that his ministry, despite the 
importance of the CIS to Russia, would not set up a special department to focus 
on CIS affairs as many of the ministry’s current departments and ministers 
already "deal with relations with [the CIS] countries." (2) 
 
So, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will not lead the effort in Russian-CIS 
relations, who will? Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the State Duma committee 
for international affairs, proposed in a radio interview on 26 May that Russia’s 
cooperation with countries of the CIS should be "implemented by the Security 
Council," because in these matters "the political will of the state should be 
concentrated in one pair of hands." (3) 
 
Kosachev, who began his government service working in the Soviet Union’s MFA 
at the age of 22 in 1984, (4) suggested that the Security Council has increased 
its role in international policy since the former foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, took 
over as its secretary. Indeed, Ivanov has been visible on several diplomatic 
missions abroad in recent weeks, including taking an active part in the removal of 
Aslan Abashidze from Adjaria, Georgia, subsequently visiting to Georgia 
regarding the status of Abkhazia, touring three Persian Gulf states, and 
representing Moscow in Astana, Kazakhstan at an extraordinary session of the 
Central Asian Cooperation Organization’s heads of state, among others. In July 
2004, Ivanov is scheduled to visit North and South Korea. 
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Were Putin to put Kosachev’s proposition into action, it would serve as a political 
marker on several counts. Firstly, limiting the MFA’s authority over and 
involvement in CIS affairs would add credibility to a recent report that Lavrov and 
the MFA are merely occupying an "auxiliary role" in the foreign policy process 
and are used simply for "articulating and implementing the presidential line." (5) 
Secondly, it would reinforce reports that the current Security Council under 
Ivanov will play a more active role in Moscow’s decision making than it did under 
his predecessor. (6) Finally, transferring the management of such an important 
issue as relations with the CIS to within the Kremlin walls would also fit the now 
familiar pattern of centralizing control of Moscow’s most important issues. 
 
Deals and progress at E.U.-Russian summit 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov declared that the 21 May 
Russian—European Union (E.U.) Summit would create a new stage in Russian—
E.U. relations. (7) Russian Presidential Aide and Presidential Special Envoy for 
relations with the European Union, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, described it as "a 
summit of substance, one of specific, concrete and pragmatic work." (8) While 
self-congratulatory descriptions of Russian (and other) summits should generally 
be taken with a grain of salt, the results of this seventh Russian—E.U. 
conference deserve a closer look. 
 
The "substance" which Yastrzhembsky mentioned manifested itself in the 
establishment of four so-called "common spaces" between the E.U. and Russia. 
These spaces, which had been proposed and discussed at earlier summits in St. 
Petersburg and Rome, consist of: 
 
1. a shared economic space; 
2. an external security space; 
3. an internal security space; and 
4. a humanitarian space involving science, technology, education and culture. 
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President Vladimir Putin called on the E.U. to prevent further delays in 
developing these common spaces and immediately appointed his coordinators 
for each of the spaces. Russian Minister of Industry and Power Viktor Khristenko 
is in charge of the common economic space. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will 
coordinate the foreign security space for Moscow. Presidential Aide Viktor Ivanov 
will organize the cooperation on the internal security space, and Presidential Aide 
Yastrzhembsky will coordinate the humanitarian segment in addition to his 
special envoy duties. (9) Once again, such an arrangement of special 
representatives demonstrates President Putin’s desires to keep crucial 
international issues firmly in his control and to limit the power of any single 
ministry or individual. 
 
The big score for Moscow at this summit, however, appears to be the E.U.’s 
acknowledgement that it will support Russia’s bid to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Yastrzhembsky denied in a 26 May radio interview that a 
deal had been struck consisting of the E.U.’s backing Russia’s joining the WTO 
in exchange for Moscow’s ratification of the Kyoto protocol. The timing of Putin’s 
announcement that he would expedite the ratification of the environmental 
protocol (at the same time as his announcement of the E.U.’s WTO position) led 
to speculation that such bargaining had indeed taken place. (10) The E.U.’s 
support for Russian acceptance into the WTO might have been the triggering 
event Putin was expecting before finally playing his "Kyoto card." 
 
Relative to the results of other presidential summits, which often produce little 
more than proclamations of "a dynamic bilateral relationship" or "potential for 
increased economic activity," this three and a half hour meeting (and no doubt 
the preceding preparatory work) appears to have produced substantial results for 
Moscow. It also represents a dramatic improvement in Russian-E.U. ties, which 
earlier this spring were somewhat strained as the 1 May expansion date loomed. 
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But despite Moscow’s claims of progress at the summit, it is still not satisfied. 
MFA spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko reminded the E.U. of its obligations 
regarding Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic states and freight transit 
between Kaliningrad and Russia proper. (11) Also, Russia continues to advocate 
for a Russian-E.U. visa-free regime. Moscow appears intent on realizing this 
goal, but as President Putin acknowledged, Russia must first improve control 
over its borders before such a system becomes possible. (12) 
 
Riding the rapids of Russian foreign relations 
Interviewing the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, for Vremya novostei on 
18 May, a journalist indicated that Lavrov’s love of white-water rafting is well-
known among Russians. Asked how the thrill of his job as foreign minister 
compared to that of white-water rafting, Lavrov explained that his new 
assignment left little time for his exhilarating hobby. And while the outside 
observer might see a similarity in managing Russia’s foreign affairs and 
traversing a wild and winding river, Lavrov coolly says that although being 
appointed Minister was exciting, "[t]he adrenaline which increases in fulfilling a 
professional task cannot be compared with the adrenaline which increases when 
rafting." (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) RTR TV, 26 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 27 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(3) Ekho Moskvy, 26 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(4) Following his 14 years in the MFA from 1984-1998, Kosachev served as aid 
to three Russian prime ministers: Sergei Kirienko, Yevgeni Primakov and Sergei 
Stepashin. In 1999, he was first elected as a State Duma deputy under the 
banner of Primakov’s Fatherland-All Russia party. In December 2003, he was 
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reelected with the United Russia election bloc. (Who’s Who in Russia website 
www.whoswho-sutter.com/w_in_russia.htm). 
(5) Kommersant, 19 Apr 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database.  
(6) Izvestiya, 27 Apr 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0427 via World News Connection 
(WNC). 
(7) ITAR-TASS, 20 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(8) Ekho Moskvy, 22 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 21 May 04; BBC Monitoring, 22 May 04 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(10) ITAR-TASS, 21 May 04; BBC Monitoring, 22 May 04 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database, 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 19 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(12) ITAR-TASS, 21 May 04; BBC Monitoring, 22 May 04 via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(13) Vremya novostei, 18 May 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(14) See NIS Observed, 28 April 2004. 
(15) See NIS Observed, 11 Dec 03 and 10 Oct 03. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
REGIONS 
The fall, and rise, of justice in the periphery 
While a recent survey indicates that jury trials, recently introduced in some 
regions, have gained the confidence of many Russians, it appears that the 
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prosecution of cases continues to be somewhat less confidence-inspiring. 
Indeed, lately it seems that, more than ever, politics, not crime, may be the 
motivation behind some prosecutorial activity. 
 
Once again, reality in Russia tends to depend on just what one wants it to be. 
The Yuri Levada Analytical Center (formerly VTsIOM) polled 1,591 Russians 
about the judicial system at the end of April, (1) and found that thirty-four percent 
of participants stated that they believed juries are fairer and more independent 
than other courts. Yet nearly another third of respondents (29%) said jurors are 
less literate and experienced and more likely to be pressured from external 
forces. 
 
There is evidence however that, in non-political cases, ordinary citizens are not 
always on the losing end of court decisions, even against government organs. 
The Agency of Judicial Information announced that, while it may take some time 
and perseverance, justice can be found in the courts. (2) 
 
The key very well may be "non-political cases." Too much evidence indicates that 
Russia’s courts continue to be used for political purposes. Case in point: the 
short-lived, but enthusiastic, attack against Saratov Governor Dmitri Ayatskov, 
who had been persecuted by Anatoli Bondar, the regional prosecutor, for abuse 
of office. The charge revolved around the governor’s alleged illegal instruction to 
pay the customs duties for a private firm’s import of harvesters, machinery that 
would be delivered to the oblast government itself. At first, Bondar stood on 
principle, claiming that "obvious elements of corruption" were apparent in a few 
gubernatorial activities. (3) And yet, the charges did not fit the statements: The 
"crime" did not involve using his office for personal gain — no one has charged 
that. Rather, the governor — who has a reputation for getting things done in his 
oblast — did not obtain prior approval from the regional duma for this budget 
expenditure, presumably intended to provide oblast-wide benefit through the 
gathering of the harvest. Bondar himself became defensive when subsequently 
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questioned about the charges, as the case began to unravel. "Why is everyone 
so hung up on the harvester story? It is just one of the episodes on which the 
prosecutor's office based its charges. We are working on several leads at once," 
he said. (4) 
 
The situation raised many questions, particularly about the motivation behind the 
charges; the "crime," after all, was committed to benefit the oblast’s economy. 
Moreover, the governor was not a thorn in Moscow’s side — a motivation, alas, 
in some other prosecutions. Although a Yel’tsin-era appointee, Ayatskov has 
been an ardent supporter of Putin’s administration, much to the dismay of his 
fellow governors. "I find all this very difficult to comprehend," Novgorod Oblast 
Governor Mikhail Prusak said, "Particularly since Ayatskov, unlike my other 
colleagues and me, always loved the federal Center. And always defended it. It is 
he who always campaigned for the federal Center's ideas. You remember: The 
land issue, then reforms that could be regarded as extremely liberal….I can't 
understand why they did this to him." (5) 
 
So who could be behind the "Ayatskov case"? Most fingers point to the 
governor’s former deputy, and now Duma Deputy Speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, 
a strong rival to Ayatskov’s re-election, who happened to be in the region when 
the charges were brought. (6) Bondar originally denied that he was following 
anyone’s instructions, and asserted that he simply was trying to ensure that 
everyone follows the law. (7) And yet, when asked by another reporter 
specifically if Volodin was behind the prosecution, Bondar began responding to 
the reporter’s questions with questions of his own. (8) 
 
Others, perhaps ignoring Ayatskov’s historical loyalty to Moscow, saw a 
conspiracy stemming from the prosecutor general’s office’s quest to build the 
"vertical of power." (9) Those allegations don’t hold up, given how the case 
turned out, however, unless one presumes that Moscow realized, a bit late in the 
game, how ill-advised it was to attack on grounds of competency one of the most 
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successful governors in the country. More likely, the center had to backtrack for 
an over-zealous regional agency seeking to curry favor with a powerful rival of 
the governor. Less than a week after the charges were instituted, the prosecutor-
general’s office announced that "the decision to launch the criminal investigation 
was premature," and criminal proceedings were cancelled. (10) 
 
While the cancellation of charges is good news for Ayatskov, it does not mean 
that courts will stop being used for political reasons; thus, prosecutors’ credibility, 
and the faith of the citizenry in the judicial system, remain at risk. 
 
Meanwhile, other regional officials are facing charges of corruption — Karelia’s 
Ministry of the Interior announced that "an organized criminal group, consisting of 
the republic's 
 
government officials, has been uncovered," although exactly who is being 
charged with exactly what remains unclear. (11) Apparently eager to jump to the 
forefront in the fight with corruption, these regional security agencies probably 
haven’t heard that the justice system is reformed. And those who have heard 
don’t seem too happy about the notion. The deputy general prosecutor has 
proposed amendments to Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code that would put the 
burden of proof on the defendant in cases where government corruption is 
charged, removing the presumption of innocence on which the judicial system 
purportedly is based. (12) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) RIA novosti, 13 May 04 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #8206, 13 May 04. 
(2) Novaya gazeta #32, 13 May 04. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 0919 GMT, 14 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0514 via World News 
Connection. (WNC) 
(4) Izvestiya, 19 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0521 via WNC. 
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(5) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0519 via WNC. 
(6) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0517 via WNC. 
(7) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0518 via WNC. 
(8) Izvestiya, 19 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0521 via WNC . 
(9) MosNews.com/Gazeta.ru, 19 May 04 via JRL #8214, 19 May 04; 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0519 via WNC. 
(10) Interfax, 1554 GMT, 20 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0520 via WNC. 
(11) Izvestiya, 14 May 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0516 via WNC. 
(12) MosNews.com, 21 May 04 via JRL #8219, 22 May 04. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
Scandal envelops Tymoshenko 
Recent accusations against Yulia Tymoshenko claim she is involved in a judicial 
bribery scandal and may have attempted to bribe judges and to compromise 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma with fraudulent foreign currency accounts. 
These charges seem likely to tarnish the opposition’s reputation before the 
presidential election in October 2004. 
 
On 18 May, Volodymyr Borovko, an aid to the BYT opposition block leader, Yulia 
Tymoshenko, made accusation against Tymoshenko saying that she gave him 
$125,000 for the purpose of bribing judges in order to make possible the release 
of her former business associates, who also happen to be relatives. Her 
associates, who are under investigation for corruption, used to work for the 
UESU (United Energy Systems of Ukraine), which was run by Tymoshenko. (1) 
When she realized the bribery attempt had failed, says Borovko, Tymoshenko 
demanded he returned her money and began threatening him. 
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Several days after his first accusation, Borovko revealed that Tymoshenko also 
asked him to help her carry out a plan that would discredit Kuchma and his 
family. Her alleged scheme consisted of opening a foreign-currency account in 
Kuchma’s name, which would later be presented as proof of Kuchma’s 
involvement in covert arms sales to countries with ties to international terrorism. 
(2) According to Borovko, the plan was never implemented. Borovko further 
claims that Tymoshenko asked him to gather information on public figures (such 
as Mykola Azarov, Viktor Medvedchuk and Viktor Yanukovich) who, she 
believed, would be willing to pay as much as $500,000 to keep the details 
concealed. (3) 
 
Tymoshenko called the accusations a "provocation" and said that Borovko had 
realized that the Prosecutor General's office had enough material to launch a 
criminal case against him and, therefore, decided to go ahead with the 
accusations in order to avoid going to court. (4) Borovko, however, presented 
rather convincing evidence of his claims, including a video that shows a woman 
who looks exactly like Tymoshenko offering assistance to Borovko in return for 
his help in bringing her to power. (5) 
 
Tymoshenko is a symbol of the Ukrainian anti-presidential opposition. She is a 
leading ally of presidential candidate Victor Yushchenko and is expected to 
support him in upcoming presidential elections. The only question is: will 
Yushchenko want her support? Associating himself with Tymoshenko after such 
accusations are not likely to help his chances of becoming president. This is not 
the first time Tymoshenko finds herself in the glare of an unfavorable spotlight. 
Tymoshenko was accused of fraud when she was working with former Prime 
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who is now on trial in the U.S. A U.S. court did 
however, recently drop charges against Lazarenko pertaining to his dealings with 
Tymoshenko’s company UESU. 
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It seems that the Ukrainian people have very difficult choices to make in October; 
neither the current administration (Yanukovich) nor the opposition (e.g., 
Tymoshenko) can apparently be trusted. Yanukovich’s previous convictions and 
the opposition represented by Tymoshenko make the choice as easy or as hard 
as choosing the lesser of two evils. 
 
BELARUS 
Belarus natural gas update 
Sibur and Beltransgas have signed an agreement that envisages the supply of 
650 million cubic meters of gas at $46. 68 per 1000 cubic meters to Belarus in 
June 2004. (6) Russia’s natural gas monopoly Gazprom holds 50.67% stake in 
Sibur. (7) Belarus still does not have a permanent contract with Gazprom. "Of 
course, this is not normal situation when there is no permanent contract with the 
main gas supplier," said Uladzimir Syamashka, the Belarusian First Deputy 
Prime Minster. (8) Beltransgas is hoping to get a permanent contract with 
Gazprom in the first half of June. Gazprom admitted it was ready to give in and 
offer Minsk lower natural gas prices — $46.7 instead of $50, but, in return, 
Gazprom wants the gas transport fee through Belarusian territory decreased, 
which is not likely to happen. (9) 
 
Gazprom stopped the natural gas supply to Belarus on 1 January, as a result of 
the disagreement over gas prices and acquisition of shares in Beltransgas. 
Alexander Lukashenko demanded $5bn for Beltransgas, when Gazprom claimed 
it was only worth $600mln. As a result of recent negotiations, the sides decided 
to have an independent appraiser, Deloitte & Touche, evaluate the company. 
(10) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Reform of the Security Council 
On 25 May, 2004, the President of Moldova issued a decree on the creation of a 
reformed Supreme Security Council (CSS). The President of Moldova will be the 
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head of the Council, and the chairman of the Supreme Security Council Service 
of the Presidential Administration, Ion Morei, will be the CSS secretary. (11) The 
CSS will be structured into the following commissions: for internal and foreign 
policies, economic and financial policy, social and environmental policies, anti-
terror policy and an analysis and information center. (12) The CSS remains an 
integral element of executive authority within the presidential administration. 
 
Release of a Gagauz prisoner 
Ivan Burgudji, an opposition politician and former chairman of the legislature of 
the Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia was recently released from 
prison. He served just under a year of his three-year sentence. Last June, the 
judges found him guilty of abusing power, thwarting a referendum of no 
confidence and anti-social group actions. Burgudji considered himself a political 
prisoner, while the authorities claim that he has been imprisoned solely on the 
bases of his criminal activity. Burgudji was convicted for "five years in a 
maximum security prison," (13) a sentence, that was later changed to "three 
years in a correctional facility of a semi-closed type." (14) He was also banned 
from occupying state posts for five years. 
 
Burgudji was a special representative to the Dniestr region and one of the 
founders of the breakaway Gagauz republic in 1990, when he was in charge of 
the Budeac special battalion — a parliamentary formation, which played the role 
of the Gagauz army. (15) Burgudji was arrested and convicted after Gagauzia 
received autonomy within Moldova in 1995. He later was released. 
 
Political observer Vladimir Tselsyuk points out in his article "Released and Very 
Dangerous," that Burgudji’s release as an unguarded prisoner could be an 
attempt by the Chisinau authorities to cast off their responsibility for his 
persecution. He speculates that should the European court deem the results of 
the Gagauz 2003 elections invalid, the Moldovan leadership would blame 
Gagauz local authorities for Burgudji’s persecution. (16) 
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After his release, Burgudji is expected to continue the dialogue with the Chisinau 
authorities about the role of Gagauz autonomy in Moldova, he is also expected to 
demand compensation for his ordeal during of his prosecution/persecution. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(5) Ibid. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
GEORGIA 
Anti-corruption drives 
 22 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s crusade to purify Georgia of 
interministerial fiscal corruption and eradicate country-wide smuggling rings and 
organized crime has prompted pervasive ministerial personnel changes. 
Additionally, Saakashvili’s anti-corruption campaign provides a plausible guise for 
asserting Georgian authority over South Ossetia. 
 
If we are to trust the claims of the politicians, the sole rationale for the Georgian 
Interior Ministry landing, via helicopter, a unit of Interior Ministry troops and a 
group of police commandos in the village of Tkvivi into the Georgian-South 
Ossetian conflict zone on 31 May was to protect the integrity of the Georgian 
anti-smuggling military operation along the Georgian-South Ossetian border. 
According to Internal Troops Commander Georgy Baramidze, the Interior 
Ministry ordered the force into the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone 
because peacekeeping contingent commander Major General Svyatoslav 
Nabzdorov reported that the village had dismantled a roadblock set up by the 
Georgian police. (1) This road-post is one of four established by the Georgian 
Interior Ministry and fiscal police in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict-zone, 
the other three are located in Eredvi, Nikozo and Khvevi in the Gori district not far 
from Tskhinvali, the capital of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia. (2) 
Georgian politicians quickly painted this ostentatious display of military might as 
necessitated by the anti-smuggling campaign, creating a political sound-bite 
molded to garner domestic support, American approval, and remain above 
Russian reproof. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania’s assertions that 
Georgia's desire to protect the police posts rests within the framework of battling 
organized crime are echoed by Interior Minister Georgy Baramidze, who also 
discreetly acknowledged the Georgian military operation as a move in the chess 
game with Russia for territorial sovereignty throughout Georgia proper by stating, 
"we shall not let the Russian military use force in a territory controlled by 
Georgian authorities." (3) Georgian Prosecutor General Irakliy Okruashvili's 
declaration that the period of Russian peacekeepers and Ossetian separatists 
dictating Georgian policy is over and his condemnation of attempts to address 
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Georgia "in the language of ultimatums" (4) reflects a Georgian political belief 
that Russia will not act on behalf of its South Ossetian ally and simultaneously 
demonstrates the Justice Ministry’s strong alignment with Saakashvili’s office. 
 
However, despite Tbilisi’s authoritative display of military and political force in the 
Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone in front of Russian peacekeeping forces, 
Russia's reaction has been primarily limited to ambiguous statements of unease 
by Andrei Kokoshin, the Chairman of the State Duma’s Committee for CIS 
Affairs, and the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Kokoshin’s and Lavrov’s 
underwhelming statements parallel each other in highlighting the overall Russian 
concern with stabilization in Georgia and a "resumption of the spirit of interaction" 
between South Ossetia and Georgia (5) and further indicate a Russian 
complacency toward Tbilisi’s activist policy regarding its separatist regions. 
Indeed, Russian-Georgian relations have not been damaged by the recent South 
Ossetian dispute as indicated by Russian participation in the 2 June meeting of 
the Mixed Monitoring Commission, a supervisory board mediating the South 
Ossetian-Georgian 1992 cease-fire line. (6) 
 
Although ostensibly acting to eradicate corruption, Saakashvili’s long-term 
intentions in South Ossetia were suggested in the official release of the 
Abkhazian Conflict Settlement Plan by Former Deputy Justice Minister Kote 
Kublashvili in an interview with Civil Georgia on 19 May. The plan, pending the 
approval of the Georgian National Security Council (NSC), envisages linking 
Tbilisi and Sukhumi within a single federal state in an attempt to settle the 
Abkhazian-Georgian dispute. Under the proposed two member federal state, 
defense and foreign policy, border defense, customs systems and the fight 
against organized crime will fall within the jurisdiction of the Tbilisi central 
authority, while the Abkhazian government would manage all other civil affairs. 
(7) Additionally, the document solely empowers the Georgian Federal State with 
military capabilities throughout the Georgian-Abkhazian federation while allowing 
for an Abkhaz police squad in the hopes of precluding the development of an 
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armed Abkhaz separatist movement. The revelation of a comprehensive 
Georgian-Abkhaz federal framework during a period of escalating tensions 
between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali offers a solution to the South Ossetian-Georgian 
conflict and alludes to Saakashvili’s ambition of constructing an all-inclusive 
Tbilisi-based Georgian federation. 
 
The South Ossetian situation also reveals that the Justice, Interior Ministry, and 
National Security Council are emerging as power-brokers in forming Georgian 
governmental policy while alluding to a marginalization of the Foreign and 
Defense Ministries. While Interior Minister Georgy Baramidze and Prosecutor 
General Irakli Okruashvili personally represented the Georgian government in 
Tskhinvali, (8) Georgian Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili was relegated to 
issuing yet another warning to Russia regarding the removal of Russian bases 
from Georgian territory, (9) while Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili 
was in the U.S. on a state visit with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. (10) 
Additionally, the Justice Ministry and the NSC maintained a high-profile 
throughout the South Ossetian dispute by serving as President Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s and Prime Minister’s Zurab Zhvania’s official media mouthpieces. 
Prosecutor General Okruashvili and NSC Secretary Vano Merabishvili gave two 
appearances on Georgian Imedi TV between 31 May and 1 June to elucidate 
Tbilisi’s South Ossetian policy, (11) outline Georgian troop involvement with 
South Ossetian and Russian peacekeepers in the Georgian-South Ossetian 
conflict zone, and repeatedly issue uncompromising statements regarding 
Georgian territorial rights in South Ossetia. (12) In comparison, Defense Minister 
Bezhuashvili has given no press conferences to date on the South Ossetian 
situation while Foreign Minister Zourabichvili’s absence has hampered direct 
media coverage and allowed only for a conciliatory statement regarding Russian-
Georgian relations, (13) leaving the incendiary rhetoric to the Interior and Justice 
Ministries. These events indicate that the Justice and Interior Ministries and the 
NSC, as opposed perhaps to the Defense and Foreign Ministries, align 
themselves with Saakashvili’s vision of total Georgian territorial cohesion, 
 25 
potentially in a federation framework, and may become the principle Georgian 
governmental institutions for formulating and executing domestic and foreign 
governmental policies. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
The development of an opposition 
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With parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2005 in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and presidential elections scheduled for 2006 in Kazakhstan, 
political opposition movements are increasing efforts to gain support and thereby 
increase their chances to have an impact on political and social change. These 
political groups seek to capitalize on discontent with the existing course of 
government, a platform shared in principle by Islamist groups active in the region, 
as the incumbent governments seek to improve security and economic prosperity 
in ways that solidify their control of power. 
 
Fomenting opposition: political and religious 
Political infighting continues in Kyrgyzstan, highlighted most recently by a report 
issued by a parliamentary ad hoc commission investigating the origin of 
wiretapping devices found in the offices of members of parliament in mid-January 
of this year. (1) Parliamentarian Alisher Abdimomunov delivered the report and 
said that "Special services were following contacts between parliamentarians and 
other politicians with the German and U.S. Embassies and also with the OSCE 
and other international organizations." (2) On 17 May, the Kyrgyz Legislative 
Assembly failed to endorse a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Nikolai 
Tanayev; the vote was introduced by Ismail Isakov (whose office was among 
those which discovered a listening device in last January) and was the second in 
two months. (3) 
 
As centrists made clear plans to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections in 
Kyrgyzstan, (4) a group called the Union for Fair Elections (UFE) was founded on 
20 May to challenge the existing government administration in next year's 
elections. UFE is comprised of a number of opposition parties — including Ar-
Namys, the Social Democrats, and the People’s Party — that, according to a 
press release, have come together with a centrist agenda to unite "for real action, 
with good intentions, despite differences in our political views or party platforms." 
(5) The question before UFE is who would be a strong candidate to replace 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev. While Akayev has denied any intention to seek 
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reelection for another term (which would clearly be a violation of constitutionally-
set term limits), many fear that he might change his mind at the last minute. 
 
For his part, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced that he would 
stand for reelection in December 2006, claiming that he would continue to "work 
as President [until 2013]… if, God willing… everything is normal." (6) Such an 
early announcement likely came as a show of resolve in response to accusations 
of Nazarbayev’s involvement in a bribery case scheduled to be heard before U.S. 
federal courts on 2 June. (7) Agreeing, however, that it is time to focus attention 
on political reform (most reforms in Kazakhstan have been directed at economic 
reform), opposition party Ak Zhol and Nazarbayev’s party, Asar, leaders 
announced their decision "to set up a joint working group to develop a political 
reform program" that would look at "decentralizing power and expanding the role 
of parliament." (8) 
 
In a push to increase the transparency of Tajikistan’s February 2005 
parliamentary elections, the Islamic Renaissance Party, the Social-Democrat 
Party, and the Socialist Party of Tajikistan, recently formed the Coalition for Just 
and Transparent Elections. Analysts suggest, however, that the coalition lacks 
the cohesiveness that its formation implies, bringing into question its potential 
effectiveness. (9) 
 
While political opposition parties, especially in Tajikistan, appear to lack 
cohesion, Islamist groups are routinely seen as a worrisome cohesive front able 
to mobilize the Muslim population. The extent to which this is true is often 
exaggerated at an ideological level, but the immediate public response to the 
March bombings in Uzbekistan suggested a moderate level of support for the 
anti-government militants; i.e. the police and Uzbek government were blamed 
with equal fervor. (10) Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) are routinely detained for 
distribution of literature about the group, (11) and Nabijon Rahimov, a Tajik 
prosecutor from the Soghd Region, suggested that support for HT in Tajikistan 
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was increasing. Furthermore, there is concern that a new Islamist group calling 
themselves Bayat — 20 members of which where arrested in mid-April in the 
Isfara District of Tajikistan — has ties with the Taliban and the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan and is attracting support among those discontent with the path 
being taken by the Tajik state. (12) 
 
Economics and Security 
The countries of the region have made efforts to increase military cooperation 
and improve regional security. (13) One hope is that improved economic 
conditions will weaken the support base for Islamist groups. Uzbekistan recently 
announced its intention to resume participation in GUUAM; (14) Kazakhstan is 
trying to position itself for membership in the World Trade Organization; (15) and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to push the creation of a Common 
Economic Space with Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. (16) 
 
While these larger agreements are designed to improve the macro-economic 
health of the region, at a micro-level regional security-related border restrictions 
have complicated cross-border trade and, for example, caused Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz villagers to take greater risks in order to subvert border-crossing 
regulations. (17) It is in these regions that many of the Islamist groups cultivate 
their numbers and it is here that the message of political opposition parties finds 
support in calls for reform and change. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Connection (WNC). 
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